The following is a compilation of cases in which the Supreme Court granted, denied, or received a petition for cert.
Petitioned
American Home Products Corporation v. Ferrari
Issue: Whether the holding in Roe v. Flores-Ortega is applicable in a habeas case where the defendant has entered into a plea agreement that includes a waiver of the right to take an appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.
Navajo Nation, et al. v. United States Forest Service, et al.
IMS Health v. Ayotte
Issue: Whether the Government must provide 30 days' notice to court and counsel before transferring detainees from Guantanamo.
Parr v. United States
Granted Certiorari and Awaiting decision
Cuomo v. Clearing
Issue: Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is consistent with separation-of-powers principles - as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is in turn overseen by the President - or contrary to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, as the PCAOB members are appointed by the SEC.
Issue: Whether parents of a student who has never previously received special education services from a school district may be eligible under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act for reimbursement of private school tuition.
Issue: Whether the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the imprisonment of a juvenile for life without the possibility of parole as punishment for the juvenile’s commission of non-homicide.
Horne v. Flores; Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives v. Flores
Issue: Whether the 2005 REAL ID Act strips courts of jurisdiction over discretionary decisions made by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Lewis, et al. v. City of Chicago
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s conviction for mail, bank and wire fraud qualified as an aggravated felony under the immigration laws, the penalty for which is lifetime banishment from the country.
Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, et al.; Republic of Iraq, et al., v. Robert Simon, et al
Issue: Whether municipalities may decline to certify results of an exam that would make disproportionately more white applicants eligible for promotion than minority applicants, due to fears that certifying the results would lead to charges of racial discrimination.
Safford United School District #1 v. Redding
Issue: Does imposition of a life without parole sentence on a thirteen-year-old for a non-homicide violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, where the freakishly rare imposition of such a sentence reflects a national consensus on the reduced criminal culpability of children?
Decided
Issue: Whether a person who uses a cell phone to buy drugs solely for personal use (a misdemeanor) can be charged with the separate crime of using a phone to facilitate the sale of drugs (a felony).
Haywood v. Drown
Issue: When an indigent defendant’s right to counsel has attached and counsel has been appointed, must the defendant take additional affirmative steps to ‘accept’ the appointment in order to secure the protections of the Sixth Amendment and preclude police-initiated interrogation without counsel present?
Issue: Whether the holding of a state post-conviction hearing to determine the mental capacity of a capital defendant whose death sentence was affirmed before Atkins v. Virginia (2002), which barred the execution of mentally retarded defendants, violates the Double Jeopardy clause.
Petitioned
American Home Products Corporation v. Ferrari
Facts: Marcelo and Carolyn Ferrari, individually and on behalf of their minor son, brought suit against several vaccine manufacturers, including American Home Products Corporation (American,) alleging that their son suffered neurological damage caused by vaccines made with the preservative thimerosal, which contained the toxic substance mercury. Ferrari's claims under Georgia law included strict liability and negligence. They specifically alleged that Appellants could and should have manufactured children's vaccines without thimerosal before Ferrari's son was vaccinated in 1998. American argued that the Vaccine Act bars design defect claims because “any vaccine-related injury would be deemed ‘unavoidable’ if the vaccine was properly prepared and accompanied by proper warnings.” They essentially equated FDA [Food and Drug Administration] approval with a determination that side effects are “unavoidable.” The Ferrari’s on the other hand, assert that design defect claims are barred only if the side effects are determined on a case-by-case basis to be “unavoidable.”
The Ferrari’s appealed. The Georgia Court of Appeals determined that two alternative readings of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22 (b)(1) exist: “One reading is that vaccine injuries are “unavoidable” and subject to preemption if the vaccine was properly prepared and accompanied by proper directions and warnings. The other reading is that design defect claims are preempted only if the side effects are determined to be unavoidable on a case-by-case basis.” The appeals court therefore held that, because two plausible, alternative readings of the Vaccine Act exist, they must conclude that the trial court erred by finding that Ferrari’s design defect claims are preempted.
Issue: Whether the holding in Roe v. Flores-Ortega is applicable in a habeas case where the defendant has entered into a plea agreement that includes a waiver of the right to take an appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.
The plea agreement specifically provided that Mabry waived any right “to appeal any conviction and sentence, including a sentence imposed within the mandatory minimum, on any and all grounds set forth in title 18 United States Code, Section 3742 or any other grounds, constitutional or nonconstitutional.” The judge and court went through a painstaking process of making sure that Mabry understood that he could not appeal the sentencing in his case on any grounds, including that his counsel as ineffective, unless there was an error that results in a miscarriage of justice. On March 9, 2006, Mabry was sentenced to 210 months' imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release.
On May 15, 2006, the District Court summarily denied the motion. It concluded that, because the four issues Mabry allegedly asked his counsel to raise were insubstantial and lacked merit, enforcement of the waiver of habeas did not work a miscarriage of justice, and Mabry's petition was therefore barred by the waiver.
Issue: Whether a governmental action cannot constitute a “substantial burden” under RFRA unless it forces individuals to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit or coerces them by threatening civil or criminal sanctions to act contrary to their religious beliefs.
Following bench trial, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Paul G. Rosenblatt, held that the proposed use did not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and granted Forest Service's motion for summary judgment on claims brought under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).
The circuit court found that the sole effect of the artificial snow is on the Plaintiffs' subjective spiritual experience. That is, the presence of the artificial snow on the Peaks is offensive to the Plaintiffs' feelings about their religion and will decrease the spiritual fulfillment Plaintiffs get from practicing their religion on the mountain. In addition, a government action that decreases the spirituality, the fervor, or the satisfaction with which a believer practices his religion is not what Congress has labeled a “substantial burden”-a term of art chosen by Congress to be defined by reference to Supreme Court precedent-on the free exercise of religion. The court therefore concluded that that the Plaintiffs failed to establish a RFRA violation. The presence of recycled wastewater on the Peaks does not coerce the Plaintiffs to act contrary to their religious beliefs under the threat of sanctions, nor does it condition a governmental benefit upon conduct that would violate their religious beliefs, as required to establish a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under RFRA. The circuit court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the Defendants on the RFRA claim, and the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the NEPA and the NHPA claims.
“The en banc majority today holds that using treated sewage effluent to make artificial snow on the most sacred mountain of southwestern Indian tribes does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). It also holds that a supposed pleading mistake prevents the tribes from arguing under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) that the Forest Service failed to consider the likelihood that children and others would ingest snow *1081 made from the effluent. I dissent from both holdings.”
Issue: Whether a New Hampshire law prohibiting certain transfers of physicians' prescribing histories for use in detailing violates the First Amendment.
These massive collections of information have great utility for certain non-profit entities ( e.g., educational institutions, public interest groups, and law enforcement agencies). New Hampshire's concern, however, is with a frankly commercial use: the exploitation of the mined data by pharmaceutical companies, whose detailers use it in marketing drugs to physicians. Detailing involves tailored one-on-one visits by pharmaceutical sales representatives with physicians and their staffs. This is time-consuming and expensive work, not suited to the marketing of lower-priced bioequivalent generic drugs (drugs that are pharmacologically indistinguishable from their brand-name counterparts save for potential differences in rates of absorption). The higher profit margins associated with brand-name drugs leaves the personal solicitation field open to brand-name drug manufacturers, who in the year 2000 spent roughly $4,000,000,000 on detailing.
Within a month of the effective date of the Prescription Information Law, the plaintiffs initiated a constitutional challenge. They filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, naming the Attorney General in her official capacity as the defendant and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Their complaint alleged that the statutory ban on transfer and use of prescriber-identifiable information transgressed the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, was void for vagueness, and offended the Commerce Clause. The district court found that the PIL regulated speech not conduct and that the governmental interests advanced in support of the law were insufficient. The court maintained that the state had failed to prove that substituting non-bioequivalent generic drugs for brand-name drugs would be generally advantageous to patients' health. In the end, the court declared the relevant portions of the Prescription Information Law unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. The court did not reach the plaintiffs' other constitutional challenges. The State of New Hampshire appealed.
The Court found that the PIL held up to the Central Hudson test, because it was enacted in the service of a substantial governmental interest, directly advances that interest, and restricts speech no more than is necessary to further that interest. The Court found that cost containment, the governmental issue cited by New Hampshire, was a substantial government interest. The Court found that the state adequately demonstrated that the PIL is reasonably calculated to advance its substantial interest in reducing overall health care costs within New Hampshire. When looking at the third prong of the Central Hudson test, the Court stated that restriction on speech should be a “last-not first-resort”. The court then went on to look at three other measures the state had taken to resolve the issue. The court found that neither the plaintiffs nor the district court identified an alternative to the Prescription Information Law that promised to achieve the goals of the law without restricting speech. Consequently, the court held that the Prescription Information Law is no more restrictive than necessary to accomplish those goals.
The Circuit Court reversed the decision of the district court, and vacated the injunction against the enforcement of the PIL. IMS Health Inc. and Verispan, LLC have petitioned the Supreme Court for Certiorari.
Kiyemba v. Obama
Facts: Nine detainees at United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, petitioned for writ of habeas corpus. Detainees requested interim relief requiring government to provide 30 days' notice to court and counsel before transferring them from naval base, asserting fears that they would be transferred to country where they might be tortured or further detained. The district court granted these requests. The Government appealed. While this appeal was pending Congress passed the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which basically says that if the United States has properly determined, or is in the process of determining, someone who is an alien as an enemy combatant, then no court can grant or hear a writ of habeas corpus. Because of MCA the DC district court dismissed the appeal due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, in Boumediene v. Bush, the supreme court held that the portion of MCA mentioned above “effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ” of habeas corpus. Therefore they reinstated the Government’s appeal.
The circuit court then looked at the merits of the petitioner’s claims. The detainees sought to prevent their transfer to any country where they are likely to be subjected to further detention or to torture. The court looked at the supreme courts decision in Munaf to determine whether their claims had merit. The court found that Munaf precludes a court from issuing a writ of habeas corpus to prevent a transfer on the grounds asserted by the petitioners. As it stands right now, it is the policy of the US government not to transfer a detainee to a country where they are likely to be tortured. The Government does everything in its power to determine whether a particular country is likely to torture a particular detainee. Under Munaf the court cannot question the Government’s determination. Therefore the detainees cannot prevail on the merits of their present claim and the Government is entitled to reversal of the orders as a matter of law. Because the detainee’s habeas claims do not hold sufficient merits the circuit court vacated the orders of the district court barring their transfer without notice during the pendency of their habeas cases.
Issue: What is the standard of proof, under the “true threat” doctrine of Virginia v. Black, for a conviction for threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction against a federal government building, and what testimonial evidence is admissible to establish an intent to threaten?
Prosecutors painted a different picture. Schultz testified that he had taken Parr's comments seriously. A number of witnesses-including three of Parr's ex-girlfriends and two former neighbors-testified that Parr had long hated the government, experimented with explosives, and admired domestic terrorists. The jury convicted Parr, and at sentencing the district judge applied two enhancements in calculating Parr's advisory sentence under the sentencing guidelines: a 12-level enhancement because Parr's offense “involved a crime of terrorism” and a 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on a finding that Parr committed perjury at trial. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3A1.4, 3C1.1. The resulting advisory guidelines range was 360 months to life in prison. The judge considered a sentence within this range to be “grossly disproportionate” to the seriousness of Parr's offense, emphasizing that it was “unclear” whether Parr had actually intended to carry out his threat and noting that his threat was not imminent. The judge sentenced Parr to a below-guidelines term of 120 months in prison. Parr appealed both his conviction and sentence, and the government appealed the sentence.
Another evidentiary challenge relates to the government action to introduce The Anarchist Cookbook book that Parr referenced in his prison-cell conversations and that had been found in his possession prior to his imprisonment. The judge initially held that only relevant portions of the book would be admitted into evidence, subject to a “specific showing of relevance” for each section admitted. But he later permitted the whole book to go to the jury during deliberations. While the court found that this was an abuse of discretion, it found that this was a harmless error.
Timeline: Oral arguments were heard on April 20, 2009.
Facts: In 2005, then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer began investigating evidence of possible racial discrimination in the residential real estate lending practices of several national banks and their operating subsidiaries. Spitzer's investigation was prompted by data that the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requires lenders to make public. On the basis of these apparent racial disparities, Spitzer sent “letters of inquiry” to mortgage lenders implicated by the data, including several national banks and their operating subsidiaries. The letters stated that such disparities “are troubling on their face, and unless legally justified may violate federal and state anti-discrimination laws such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its state counterpart, New York State Executive Law § 296-a.” The letters requested that lenders voluntarily produce certain non-public information regarding their mortgage policies and practices, as well as data concerning loans related to real property in New York State.
The attorney general's office argued that the OCC’s regulation was unlawful and should be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act. The attorney general asserted that racial disparities reflected in the HMDA data “established a prima facie case, under the federal Fair Housing Act,” as well as under New York State Executive Law § 296-a. He argued that his investigation was not a prohibited exercise of visitorial powers, and that the OCC was not acting aggressively in this area. He also noted that he was empowered to sue under the Fair Housing Act, and that even if such a suit were considered a “visitation” it would come within the exception for “visitorial powers.”
On Jan. 16, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Oral arguments were heard on 4/28/09.
Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al.
Issue: Whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is consistent with separation-of-powers principles - as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is in turn overseen by the President - or contrary to the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, as the PCAOB members are appointed by the SEC.
The anti-tax group Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead & Watts LLP, a small Nevada accounting firm, filed a lawsuit in 2006, asserting that the Act violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by the mode of selection and removal of members of the oversight board. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the oversight board.
On Nov. 17, 2008, the full circuit, voting 5-4, denied rehearing en banc. “At every level, it is clear that this Court’s review is warranted,” FEF and Beckstead argued in urging the Supreme Court to accept the case. “The issues presented go to the heart of the relationship between the Legislative and Executive Branches and all agree that this is a ‘case of first impression’ because it involves a wholly unprecedented model for federal agencies.”
Timeline: Oral Arguments were held 4/28/09
Facts: Oregon parents decided to withdraw their son from the Forest Grove School District because they felt the student was not receiving adequate education and services. During his freshman year of high school, the boy was referred for an evaluation to determine whether he had a learning disability that qualified him for services under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The team of specialists unanimously concluded that student, known in filings as T.A., did not have a learning disability and therefore was ineligible for special education. T.A.’s mother, who attended the meeting, agreed with that determination. No one ever followed up on either the reference to “[p]ossible 504” in the psychologist’s report or the references to “suspected ADHD” in the School District’s staff meeting notes. At some point during the next year, T.A. began using marijuana. Eventually, his use became regular, and he exhibited noticeable personality changes. T.A. ran away from home. The police brought him back a few days later. T.A.’s parents took him to a psychologist and, eventually, to a hospital emergency room. Dr. Fulop, a psychologist hired by T.A.’s parents, met with T.A. a number of times in early 2003. Dr. Fulop held several lengthy sessions immediately after T.A. ran away from home, and he eventually diagnosed T.A. with ADHD, depression, math disorder, and cannabis abuse. Dr. Fulop recommended a residential program.
The school district appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, arguing that reimbursement was unwarranted because T.A. unilaterally withdrew from public school without providing prior notice to the school district, he never received special education and related services from the school district, and he withdrew for reasons unrelated to his disability (that is, substance abuse and behavioral problems). The district court reversed the hearing officer’s grant of reimbursement to T.A., but a three-judge panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the hearing officer’s determination.
The school district asked the Supreme Court to hear the case. On Jan. 16, the court accepted the case for review. Oral arguments were held 4/28/09.
Graham v. Florida
Issue: Whether the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the imprisonment of a juvenile for life without the possibility of parole as punishment for the juvenile’s commission of non-homicide.
Graham contends that a life sentence for a minor is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Florida district court of appeals affirmed the sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 4, 2009. Arguments will be heard in the upcoming fall term.
Timeline: Oral Arguments were hear on 4/21/09
Facts: On January 24, 2000, the District Court for the District of Arizona ruled that Arizona was violating the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (“EEOA”), because the state’s funding for English language instruction for non-native speakers or English language learners (ELL) was “not reasonably calculated to effectively implement the . . . educational theory which” the state had approved. Eight years later, Arizona has still not satisfied the terms of that judgment, nor complied with the bulk of the injunctions entered against it as a result of that ruling. Although Arizona and the Arizona Board of Education acknowledge that the state remains out of compliance and do not seek to vacate the judgment or the injunctive orders, the Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, and the President of the Arizona Senate moved for relief from judgment.
By this point, six years after the Declaratory Judgment, the positions of the parties had shifted, with Arizona and the state Board of Education abandoning their defense of the suit and largely siding with Flores. As a result, when, on March 3, 2006, the state Attorney General moved on behalf of Arizona for the court to consider whether HB 2064 satisfied its order, he was arguing against Arizona’s own law. The Superintendent, however, maintained his position and was joined by the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives and the President of the Arizona Senate as interveners (we refer to them as the “Legislative Interveners”). Later that March, these parties moved to purge contempt and, in the alternative, for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(5). Their joint motion was based largely on HB 2064, which, they contended, “creates a plan for adequate funding of programs for [ELL students],” and brings Arizona into compliance. The district court disagreed, ruling on April 25, 2006, that HB 2064 does not comply with its orders or with the Declaratory Judgment because the “Act does not [bear] any rational relationship to the cost of providing an ELL program . . . and it has added new hurdles to the mix.”
Timeline: Certiorari granted on 04/27/2009. Oral arguments will be heard at the beginning of the fall term.
Facts: Agron Kucana, a native of Albania, came to the United States in July 1995 on a business visa. He applied for political asylum because of his political involvement in his native country. Kucana overslept and missed his asylum hearing. When he didn’t show up, the immigration judge denied asylum and ordered him deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied a motion to reopen in 2002. Four years later, having not yet been deported, Kucana filed a second motion to reopen; claiming, among other things, that changed conditions in his home country of Albania warranted reconsideration of the disposition of his application for asylum. When the BIA denied the motion to reopen again, Kucana sought review in the Seventh Circuit.
On April 27, the Supreme Court granted review. The justices will hear oral arguments when the court begins its fall term on Oct. 5.
Lewis, et al. v. City of Chicago
Facts: In 1995 the City of Chicago gave a new written test to 26,000 applicants for jobs as firefighters. After grading the tests, the City placed the applicants in three categories, based on their scores: “well qualified,” “qualified,” and “not qualified.” The plaintiffs (and the members of their class) are black applicants who were placed in the “qualified” category. They were told these results within days after the tests were mailed January 26, 2996. On the same day, the mayor announced that the city on planned on hiring 600 of the 1,782 applicants in the “well qualified” category in the next three years, implying that no one in the “qualified” category would be hired. The suit, now entering its second decade, charges that the test had a disparate impact on the black applicants (that is, disproportionately classified them as “qualified” rather than “well qualified”) and was not a valid test of aptitude for firefighting. If these things are true, the basing of hiring decisions on the test violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After protracted proceedings, the district judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and decreed injunctive relief.
420 days after the date on which notice of the results of the test had been sent them and probably 417 to 419 days after they received the notice. But it was within 300 days of the City’s beginning to hire applicants from the “well qualified” list, and the district judge ruled that the suit was therefore timely because each time the City hired applicants in the “well qualified” group as determined on the basis of the January 1996 test results it committed a fresh violation of Title VII that may have harmed “qualified” applicants.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on May 18th, 2009.
Nijhawan v. Holder
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s conviction for mail, bank and wire fraud qualified as an aggravated felony under the immigration laws, the penalty for which is lifetime banishment from the country.
For purposes of sentencing, Nijhawan stipulated that the loss from the fraud conspiracy offense “exceeds $100 million.” The judgment of conviction indicated that the total loss associated with the offenses was $683,632,800. Nijhawan was sentenced to 41 months in prison and ordered, jointly and severally with his co-defendants, to pay restitution in the amount of the loss.
The immigration judge denied a motion to terminate the proceedings and ordered Nijhawan removed to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. In May 2008, a divided three-judge panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also affirmed, siding with the government. Nijhawan appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Timeline: Oral arguments were heard on 4/20/09
Facts: United States citizens Kevin Beaty, who worked on an oil rig, and William Barloon, who supervised aircraft maintenance and overhaul, were detained and allegedly held as hostages by the former Iraqi regime in the 1990s. Along with other former detainees and their spouses, Beaty and Barloon filed suit against Iraq in 1996, eventually obtaining a default judgment against it. The plaintiffs in this case are the children of Kevin Beaty and William Barloon. Invoking the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), plaintiffs seek damages against Iraq for the emotional distress that they allegedly suffered during their fathers' captivity. The Iraqi government filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs’ claims are either non-justiciable or preempted because of their potential to undermine US foreign policy. The plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment.
The district court rejected Iraq's claim that "adjudication of plaintiffs' claims ‘would compromise critical U.S. foreign policy objectives,'" as well as its claims that the political question, act-of-state, and foreign affairs preemption doctrines rendered the case non-justiciable. The court also considered Iraq's argument, supported by the United States in a Statement of Interest, that President Bush reinstated Iraq's sovereign immunity pursuant to the 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act ("EWSAA"), which provided for, among other things, wartime funding and homeland security efforts. It also authorized the President to "make inapplicable with respect to Iraq" provisions of law that apply to countries that have supported terrorism. Shortly after EWSAA's passage, President Bush issued a determination that FSIA's terrorism exception no longer applied to Iraq. The issue, however, had already been decided in Acree, an earlier D.C. Circuit case holding that the language in EWSAA, read in context, was meant to make economic sanctions inapplicable to Iraq, rather than FSIA's exceptions to sovereign immunity.
The Court also stated that Counts II and III of the plaintiffs claim must be dismissed because they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court decided this because both claims assert federal-common-law claims and federal common law cannot, serve as a rule of decision in.. section 1605 (a)(7) cases.” However the Court did find that the first claim, seeking recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state common law, is a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Ricci, et al. v. DeStefano, et al.
Issue: Whether municipalities may decline to certify results of an exam that would make disproportionately more white applicants eligible for promotion than minority applicants, due to fears that certifying the results would lead to charges of racial discrimination.
On the other side, Donald Day, a representative of the Northeast Region of the International Association of Black Professional Firefighters, argued against certification, stating that previous promotional examinations in 1996 and 1999 had black and Latino firefighters ranked sufficiently high to have a realistic opportunity for promotion, whereas “there was something inherently wrong with this test” because minorities did not score as highly.
Defendants filed for summary judgment for four claims relating to civil rights, discussed below. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants in all four claims. The 2nd Circuit Court of appeals upheld the district court’s ruling.
Equal Protection Claim: Plaintiffs argue that defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause either by employing a race-based classification system for promotion or, alternatively, by applying facially neutral promotion criteria in a racially discriminatory manner. The Court found that they were not acting out of an intentionally discriminatory matter. Rather, they acted based on the following concerns: that the test had a statistically adverse impact on African-American and Hispanic examinees; that promoting off of this list would undermine their goal of diversity in the Fire Department and would fail to develop managerial role models for aspiring firefighters; that it would subject the City to public criticism; and that it would likely subject the City to Title VII lawsuits from minority applicants that, for political reasons, the City did not want to defend.
First Amendment: Plaintiffs do not attempt to rebut defendants' contentions that plaintiffs did not identified a free speech activity in which they participated nor claimed that any chilling of speech resulted. Rather, plaintiffs argued that there were grounds for a freedom-of-association claim because the CSB's non-certification decision, and the City defendants' advocacy of that decision, resulted from political pressure by defendant Kimber, who threatened the CSB with “political ramifications” if they voted to certify the results. However, the court found that defendants acted to head off the potential adverse impact of the promotion tests on African-American and Hispanic firefighters in order to curry favor with minority voters and political leaders in the City, but it does not contain any evidence of an intent or purpose to target plaintiffs for not supporting that political coalition or its interests.
Safford United School District #1 v. Redding
Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits public school officials from conducting a strip search of a student suspected of possessing and distributing a prescription drug on campus in violation of school policy.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona ruled for the school district, holding that school officials did not violate Redding’s Fourth Amendment rights in any respect as the search complied with the standard set forth by the 9th Circuit in New Jersey v. TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
On Jan. 16, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case for review.
Issue: Does imposition of a life without parole sentence on a thirteen-year-old for a non-homicide violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, where the freakishly rare imposition of such a sentence reflects a national consensus on the reduced criminal culpability of children?
The Florida district court of appeals affirmed the conviction without opinion and the Supreme Court of Florida denied review without opinion. Sullivan argues that since their clients’ crimes didn’t involve murder, a life sentence without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
Decided
Abuelhawa v. U.S.
Facts: This case stems from petitioner Salman Khade Abuelhawa’s use of a cell phone (which, Abuelhawa does not dispute, is a “communication facility”) to procure drugs. On two separate days in July 2003, Abuelhawa placed multiple calls to a local cocaine distributor to arrange two purchases of small amounts of cocaine for personal use. Unbeknownst to Abuelhawa, the dealer was the subject of a federal drug-distribution investigation, and his phone was wiretapped. Months after the conversations, Abuelhawa was arrested. He admitted purchasing cocaine from Said in the past, although not in connection with the July 2003 phone calls. Instead of charging him with drug possession (a misdemeanor), the government charged Abuelhawa with several violations of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), alleging that he had used his cell phone to facilitate the dealer’s felony sale of drugs to him.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Like the district court, the court of appeals acknowledged that other circuits “are divided on the issue.” However, it concluded that § 843(b) permits Abuelhawa’s conviction because the statute “does not specify whose felony must be at issue, just that ‘a’ felony must be facilitated.” Under the language of the statute, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, it was “simply irrelevant” that Abuelhawa’s own possession offense was a misdemeanor, because it was his use of a cell phone that had facilitated a felony sale.
Issue: Whether a state law barring state courts from hearing damages actions against corrections officers violates the Supremacy Clause by not permitting adjudication of claims under 42 USC 1983.
The trial court dismissed both complaints as barred by New York Correction Law §24, which provides that New York courts lack jurisdiction to entertain any private claim for damages against correction employees in their personal capacity for acts or omissions committed on the job. Such claims for damages may be brought directly against the State of New York in the New York State Court of Claims.
In asking the Supreme Court to hear the case, Haywood argued that “the New York Court of Appeals’ decision is in severe tension with several decisions of this Court, affects many current and future litigants and – if unchecked – is likely to embolden other states to selectively close their courts to those federal rights with which they disagree or to impose other burdens simply by applying their substantive legislative policies to preclude or burden identical narrowly delineated state claims.”
Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined in Part III by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel A. Alito. "Neither the Consti tution nor our precedent requires New York to open its courts to §1983 federal actions," Thomas asserted.
Montejo v. Louisiana
Facts: In late 2002, Patricia Ferrari returned to her Slidell, Louisiana home to discover her husband, Lewis Ferrari, dead on the kitchen floor from gunshot wounds to his head and chest. Suspicion quickly turned to Jerry Moore, whom Mr. Ferrari had employed in his dry-cleaning business. In the months leading up to the murder, Mr. Ferrari’s relationship with Mr. Moore had soured; witnesses contend that the two had argued publicly (including on the day of the murder) because Mr. Moore had lost his driver’s license and was forced to rely on a friend, Jesse Jay Montejo, for transportation, making Mr. Moore unreliable. Mr. Ferrari’s neighbors reported that they saw Mr. Montejo’s van—known for its distinctive chrome cattle bar on its front bumper—carrying a passenger and speeding away from the area around Mr. Ferrari’s home around the time of the murder. Mr. Ferrari’s white Lincoln, which had been stolen from his home, was seen closely following the van. Subsequent forensics found Mr. Montejo’s DNA under Mr. Ferrari’s fingernails.
Mr. Montejo’s subsequent descriptions of the crime amounted to a confession that he was involved with the murder along with two accomplices, Mr. Moore and an individual identified only as “D.P.” Following these statements, Mr. Montejo and Mr. Moore were arrested for murder.
The day after the hearing, the same detectives who had previously interrogated Mr. Montejo asked for his assistance in locating the murder weapon. Petitioner contends, and respondent does not disagree, that this too was a “critical stage.” Mr. Montejo said that he believed he was represented by counsel, but the detectives informed him otherwise. (The detectives later claimed that they were unaware Mr. Montejo was represented, even though a representative of the police department attended Mr. Montejo’s 72-hour hearing.) The detectives read Mr. Montejo his Miranda rights, which he agreed to waive, and proceeded to question him about the crime without his counsel present. During this questioning, Mr. Montejo wrote a note to Mrs. Ferrari in which he apologized for murdering her husband and indicated that he had only intended to commit a “simple burglary,” which in Louisiana is a technical legal term that describes a particular level of offense within the penal code. The detectives testified at trial that Mr. Montejo spontaneously produced the letter. However, Mr. Montejo testified that the letter was dictated to him by the detectives.
At trial, the state relied heavily on Mr. Montejo’s letter, while Mr. Montejo altered his narrative of events and argued that although he had been involved in an altercation with Mr. Ferrari prior to the murder, he did not take part in the shooting. Mr. Montejo was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
In asking the Supreme Court to review the case, attorneys for Montejo argue that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision conflicts with decisions of at least four other state courts of last resort, along with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, “The decision below is certain to lead to a proliferation of factual controversies over what constitutes ‘acceptance’ and whether or not such ‘acceptance’ occurred in every case in which a defendant with appointed counsel has been subjected to police-initiated interrogation (particularly given that most States do not transcribe initial hearings at which counsel is appointed.”
Noting that the benefits of the Jackson rule are “dwarfed by its substantial costs,” but at the same time refusing to embrace the Louisiana Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of Jackson in the decision below—that a defendant must affirmatively request counsel before the Sixth Amendment’s protections apply—the Court set down an entirely new doctrinal path. Blurring the line between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right could be waived “so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing and intelligent,” which could be established by the state’s rote recitation of the defendant’s Miranda rights, and the defendant’s un-counseled, voluntary, waiver of those rights.
The Court recognized that these rules will not provide represented defendants any protection against “badgering” when they are not in custody or, alternatively, engaged in a “noninterrogative type[] of interaction” – such as a pretrial line-up – with police. Moreover, it acknowledged that its new rules will not allow represented defendants to “anticipatorily” invoke their right to counsel, but instead will require them to reassert their desire for counsel each time they are interrogated by the state. Nonetheless, the Court found that the existing Fifth Amendment protections are “sufficient” to prevent defendants from being coerced into waiving their right to representation at critical stages.
Finally, underlying the doctrinal developments was a debate over the weight of stare decisis. Justice Scalia, in the majority, argued that here an adherence to stare decisis was unnecessary because Jackson was poorly reasoned, balancing the risks and benefits of its rule improperly. Justice Alito, with whom Justice Kennedy joined, wrote a separate concurrence to note that if the Court could reject stare decisis and overturn New York v. Beltran (1981), as it did with Arizona v. Gant (2009), then the majority was entitled to do the same with Jackson. Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that Jackson was not poorly reasoned, and although Beltran needed to be reversed, Jackson did not. Justice Breyer refused to join part of this dissent to reiterate that, in his view, both this case and Gant were wrongly decided because of the binding nature of stare decisis.
Bobby v. Bies
Facts: In October 1992, an Ohio state jury found Michael Bies guilty of kidnapping, attempted rape and murder of a 10-year-old boy. During the sentencing phase, his counsel presented evidence that Bies was mentally retarded. Nevertheless, the jury recommended the death sentence and the trial court accepted this recommendation.
In February 2008, a three-judge panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted habeas corpus relief and ordered that a sentence other than death be imposed.
On June 1, 2009, a unanimous court reversed and remanded the case in an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. “The Sixth Circuit, in common with the District Court, fundamentally misperceived the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) component,” Ginsburg wrote. Bies now has an opportunity to argue that he should not be executed because of mental retardation and the state can refute the claim.
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